4 research outputs found
Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Desire-Luck Problem
Jackson (1991) proposes an interpretation of consequentialism, namely, the Decision Theoretic Consequentialism (DTC), which provides a middle ground between internal and external criteria of rightness inspired by decision theory. According to DTC, a right decision either leads to the best outcomes (external element) or springs from right motivations (internal element). He raises an objection to fully external interpretations, like objective consequentialism (OC), which he claims that DTC can resolve. He argues that those interpretations are either too objective, which prevents them from giving guidance for action, or their guidance leads to wrong and blameworthy actions or decisions. I discuss how the emphasis on blameworthiness in DTC constraints its domain to merely the justification of decisions that relies on rationality to provide a justification criterion for moral
decisions. I provide examples that support the possibility of rational but immoral decisions that are at odds with DTC’s prescription for right decisions. Moreover, I argue what I call the desire-luck problem for the external element of justification criterion leads to the same objection for DTC that Jackson raised for OC. Therefore, DTC, although successful in response to some objections, fails to provide a prescription for the right decision
The Morality of Social Movements
Understanding a normative concept like oppression requires attention to not only its
harms but also the causes of those harms. In other words, a complete understanding of such a
concept requires a proper causal explanation. This causal explanation can also inform and
constrain our moral response to such harms. Therefore, the conceptual explanatory framework
that we use to inform our moral diagnosis and our moral response become significant. The first
goal of this dissertation is to propose complexity theory as the proper framework for not only
explaining a social phenomenon like oppression but also understanding the proper sites for social
change. The second goal of this dissertation is to answer three interrelated questions about how
we should respond, morally, to a chronic and complex social problem like racial or gender
inequality: (1) Why do the current interventions to address these problems fail? (2) Do social
movements play any unique role in addressing these problems? (3) What is our individual
responsibility to participate in social movements? In response, I argue that the explanatory
frameworks that we choose to understand the cause(s) of social problems can be the source of the
inadequacy of our intervention. I argue that a proper social and moral intervention needs to
capture the complex and dynamic nature of the social world. I also show that changing the
explanatory framework allows us to see the unique role social movements play in making
effective and sustainable social change possible. Finally, I conclude supporting such movements
is a moral imperative
The Transformative Power of Social Movements
Social movements possess transformative and progressive power. In this paper, I argue that how this is so, or even if this is so, depends on one's explanatory framework. I consider three such explanatory frameworks for social movements: methodological individualism, collectivism, and complexity theory. In evaluating the various appeals and weaknesses of these frameworks, I show that complexity theory is uniquely poised to capture the complex and dynamic reality of the social world
Hoping With: an Editorial Introduction
My goal is to help us see the importance of social connections to social change in even our conceptual toolbox regarding social transformation. I compare and summarize two discussions about the political value of hope: one in Western modern political thought and the other in non-violent movements and their subsequent philosophy. I follow Michelle Moody- Adams’ conviction that visionaries and intellectuals of constructive social movements ground political hope in collectives rather than in individuals, as Western political philosophy tends to do. However, I suggest that the proper interpretation of a collectivist hope requires attention to the people with whom we hope